Junjie Shen

selected publications

1. arXiv

   SoK: On the Semantic AI Security in Autonomous Driving

   Junjie Shen, Ningfei Wang, Ziwen Wan, Yunpeng Luo, Takami Sato, Zhisheng Hu, Xinyang Zhang, Shengjian Guo, Zhenyu Zhong, Kang Li, Ziming Zhao, Chunming Qiao, and Qi Alfred Chen

   arXiv:2203.05314 2022

   Abstract Paper Website

   Autonomous Driving (AD) systems rely on AI components to make safety and correct driving decisions. Unfortunately, today’s AI algorithms are known to be generally vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, for such AI component-level vulnerabilities to be semantically impactful at the system level, it needs to address non-trivial semantic gaps both (1) from the system-level attack input spaces to those at AI component level, and (2) from AI component-level attack impacts to those at the system level. In this paper, we define such research space as semantic AI security as opposed to generic AI security. Over the past 5 years, increasingly more research works are performed to tackle such semantic AI security challenges in AD context, which has started to show an exponential growth trend.
   
   In this paper, we perform the first systematization of knowledge of such growing semantic AD AI security research space. In total, we collect and analyze 53 such papers, and systematically taxonomize them based on research aspects critical for the security field. We summarize 6 most substantial scientific gaps observed based on quantitative comparisons both vertically among existing AD AI security works and horizontally with security works from closely-related domains. With these, we are able to provide insights and potential future directions not only at the design level, but also at the research goal, methodology, and community levels. To address the most critical scientific methodology-level gap, we take the initiative to develop an open-source, uniform, and extensible system-driven evaluation platform, named PASS, for the semantic AD AI security research community. We also use our implemented platform prototype to showcase the capabilities and benefits of such a platform using representative semantic AD AI attacks.

2. NDSS

   Too Afraid to Drive: Systematic Discovery of Semantic DoS Vulnerability in Autonomous Driving Planning under Physical-World Attacks

   Ziwen Wan, Junjie Shen, Jalen Chuang, Xin Xia, Joshua Garcia, Jiaqi Ma, and Qi Alfred Chen

   In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) 2022 (Acceptance rate 14.1% = 53/377)

   Abstract Paper Website

   In high-level Autonomous Driving (AD) systems, behavioral planning is in charge of making high-level driving decisions such as cruising and stopping, and thus highly securitycritical. In this work, we perform the first systematic study of semantic security vulnerabilities specific to overly-conservative AD behavioral planning behaviors, i.e., those that can cause failed or significantly-degraded mission performance, which can be critical for AD services such as robo-taxi/delivery. We call them semantic Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerabilities, which we envision to be most generally exposed in practical AD systems due to the tendency for conservativeness to avoid safety incidents. To achieve high practicality and realism, we assume that the attacker can only introduce seemingly-benign external physical objects to the driving environment, e.g., off-road dumped cardboard boxes.
   
   To systematically discover such vulnerabilities, we design PlanFuzz, a novel dynamic testing approach that addresses various problem-specific design challenges. Specifically, we propose and identify planning invariants as novel testing oracles, and design new input generation to systematically enforce problemspecific constraints for attacker-introduced physical objects. We also design a novel behavioral planning vulnerability distance metric to effectively guide the discovery. We evaluate PlanFuzz on 3 planning implementations from practical open-source AD systems, and find that it can effectively discover 9 previouslyunknown semantic DoS vulnerabilities without false positives. We find all our new designs necessary, as without each design, statistically significant performance drops are generally observed. We further perform exploitation case studies using simulation and real-vehicle traces. We discuss root causes and potential fixes.

3. USENIX Security

   Dirty Road Can Attack: Security of Deep Learning based Automated Lane Centering under Physical-World Attack

   Takami Sato*, Junjie Shen*, Ningfei Wang, Yunhan Jack Jia, Xue Lin, and Qi Alfred Chen

   In USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security) 2021 (Acceptance rate 18.7% = 246/1316)

   Abstract Paper Extended Version Code Website 量子位 新华网

   Automated Lane Centering (ALC) systems are convenient and widely deployed today, but also highly security and safety critical. In this work, we are the first to systematically study the security of state-of-the-art deep learning based ALC systems in their designed operational domains under physical-world adversarial attacks. We formulate the problem with a safety-critical attack goal, and a novel and domain-specific attack vector: dirty road patches. To systematically generate the attack, we adopt an optimization-based approach and overcome domain-specific design challenges such as camera frame inter-dependencies due to attack-influenced vehicle control, and the lack of objective function design for lane detection models.
   
   We evaluate our attack on a production ALC using 80 scenarios from real-world driving traces. The results show that our attack is highly effective with over 97.5% success rates and less than 0.903 sec average success time, which is substantially lower than the average driver reaction time. This attack is also found (1) robust to various real-world factors such as lighting conditions and view angles, (2) general to different model designs, and (3) stealthy from the driver’s view. To understand the safety impacts, we conduct experiments using software-in-the-loop simulation and attack trace injection in a real vehicle. The results show that our attack can cause a 100% collision rate in different scenarios, including when tested with common safety features such as automatic emergency braking. We also evaluate and discuss defenses.

4. USENIX Security

   Drift with Devil: Security of Multi-Sensor Fusion based Localization in High-Level Autonomous Driving under GPS Spoofing

   Junjie Shen, Jun Yeon Won, Zeyuan Chen, and Qi Alfred Chen

   In USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security) 2020 (Acceptance rate 16.1% = 157/977)

   Abstract Paper Extended Version Slides Website Talk Demo 1 Demo 2 Dataset 新华网 Synced

   For high-level Autonomous Vehicles (AV), localization is highly security and safety critical. One direct threat to it is GPS spoofing, but fortunately, AV systems today predominantly use Multi-Sensor Fusion (MSF) algorithms that are generally believed to have the potential to practically defeat GPS spoofing. However, no prior work has studied whether today’s MSF algorithms are indeed sufficiently secure under GPS spoofing, especially in AV settings. In this work, we perform the first study to fill this critical gap. As the first study, we focus on a production-grade MSF with both design and implementation level representativeness, and identify two AV-specific attack goals, off-road and wrong-way attacks.
   
   To systematically understand the security property, we first analyze the upper-bound attack effectiveness, and discover a take-over effect that can fundamentally defeat the MSF design principle. We perform a cause analysis and find that such vulnerability only appears dynamically and non-deterministically. Leveraging this insight, we design FusionRipper, a novel and general attack that opportunistically captures and exploits take-over vulnerabilities. We evaluate it on 6 real-world sensor traces, and find that FusionRipper can achieve at least 97% and 91.3% success rates in all traces for off-road and wrong-way attacks respectively. We also find that it is highly robust to practical factors such as spoofing inaccuracies. To improve the practicality, we further design an offline method that can effectively identify attack parameters with over 80% average success rates for both attack goals, with the cost of at most half a day. We also discuss promising defense directions.

5. ICSE

   A Comprehensive Study of Autonomous Vehicle Bugs

   Joshua Garcia, Yang Feng, Junjie Shen, Sumaya Almanee, Yuan Xia, and Qi Alfred Chen

   In ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE) 2020 (Acceptance rate 23.5% = 129/550)

   Abstract Paper Dataset

   Self-driving cars, or Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), are increasingly becoming an integral part of our daily life. About 50 corporations are actively working on AVs, including large companies such as Google, Ford, and Intel. Some AVs are already operating on public roads, with at least one unfortunate fatality recently on record. As a result, understanding bugs in AVs is critical for ensuring their security, safety, robustness, and correctness. While previous studies have focused on a variety of domains (e.g., numerical software; machine learning; and error-handling, concurrency, and performance bugs) to investigate bug characteristics, AVs have not been studied in a similar manner. Recently, two software systems for AVs, Baidu Apollo and Autoware, have emerged as frontrunners in the opensource community and have been used by large companies and governments (e.g., Lincoln, Volvo, Ford, Intel, Hitachi, LG, and the US Department of Transportation). From these two leading AV software systems, this paper describes our investigation of 16,851 commits and 499 AV bugs and introduces our classification of those bugs into 13 root causes, 20 bug symptoms, and 18 categories of software components those bugs often affect. We identify 16 major findings from our study and draw broader lessons from them to guide the research community towards future directions in software bug detection, localization, and repair.

6. ICLR

   Fooling Detection Alone is Not Enough: Adversarial Attack against Multiple Object Tracking

   Yunhan Jia*, Yantao Lu*, Junjie Shen, Qi Alfred Chen, Hao Chen, Zhenyu Zhong, and Tao Wei

   In International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR) 2020 (Acceptance rate 26.5% = 687/2594)

   Abstract Paper Code

   Recent work in adversarial machine learning started to focus on the visual perception in autonomous driving and studied Adversarial Examples (AEs) for object detection models. However, in such visual perception pipeline the detected objects must also be tracked, in a process called Multiple Object Tracking (MOT), to build the moving trajectories of surrounding obstacles. Since MOT is designed to be robust against errors in object detection, it poses a general challenge to existing attack techniques that blindly target objection detection: we find that a success rate of over 98% is needed for them to actually affect the tracking results, a requirement that no existing attack technique can satisfy. In this paper, we are the first to study adversarial machine learning attacks against the complete visual perception pipeline in autonomous driving, and discover a novel attack technique, tracker hijacking, that can effectively fool MOT using AEs on object detection. Using our technique, successful AEs on as few as one single frame can move an existing object in to or out of the headway of an autonomous vehicle to cause potential safety hazards. We perform evaluation using the Berkeley Deep Drive dataset and find that on average when 3 frames are attacked, our attack can have a nearly 100% success rate while attacks that blindly target object detection only have up to 25%.